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Thaksin and Budget Allocation: A Study in Political Compromise
Kriangchai Pungprawat *
Abstract
As a strong executive, Thaksin Shinawatra brought many changes to Thai politics and 
public administration, including to budget allocation.  This article explains how the 
Thaksin government procured funds to implement many ‘populist’ policies.  Before Thaksin, 
budget allocation was dominated by the bureaucracy.  Initially, Thaksin attempted to reform 
the system by removing the prerogative over budget allocation from the bureaucracy.  
This effort, however, failed due to resistance from the Bureau of the Budget.  As a 
result, budget allocation came to rest upon compromise between government leaders 
and the Bureau of the Budget.  Almost all funds for Thaksin’s policies came from the 
Central Fund and revolving fund within the existing budgeting system.  This article also 
shows that budget allocation under Thaksin did not damage Thailand’s public fi nances.
Introduction
Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister of Thailand from 2001 to 2006, is considered one of the most 
powerful leaders in Thai history.  Scholars have coined such expressions as Thaksinocracy [Rangsan 
2005: 1], Thaksinomics [Rangsan 2005: 13-14] and Thaksinization [McCargo and Ukrist 2005] to 
describe the unique political circumstances of the Thaksin administration.  There has, however, been 
no serious analysis of budget allocation under Thaksin.  An interesting question remains: How did 
the Thaksin government exercise the power over budgeting needed to implement its many ‘populist’ 
policies?  This study marks a fi rst attempt to gauge the relationship between political transformation 
and budget allocation under Thaksin.
During the 2001 election campaign, the Thai Rak Thai Party announced an ambitious policy 
platform.  It did not however, clarify how it would fi nance its proposals.  This invited criticism that 
Thai Rak Thai policies were fanciful and mere propaganda intended to win the rural vote [Somboon 
2000: 16].  After the formation of the Thaksin government, however, almost all campaign pledges 
became offi cial policy, and they were effectively implemented within one year.  Part 1 of this article 
describes the origins and scope of Thaksin government policies.
When the Thaksin administration took offi ce, it had to follow the same fi scal rules as 
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the previous government.1）  It faced, moreover, two important obstacles: the framework of fi scal 
discipline and the departmental-based character of budget allocation.
On the one hand, the Thai Rak Thai Party’s policies were very new and required a large budget. 
On the other hand, fi scal rules placed strict limits on budget defi cits.
The departmental-based system of budget allocation derives partly from the character of public 
administration in Thailand, in which every department has its own juristic person status.  The 
department, rather than the ministry, is the budget unit and receives its funding directly from the 
government.  Consequently, the annual budget is determined in a bottom-up fashion, and the size 
of the budget is based on demands from each department.  The Thaksin government had to decide 
which department would be responsible for each policy, since these policies were based on agendas, 
not functions.
A department’s budget, moreover, consists mainly of current expenditures.  Between the 1999 
and 2006 fi scal years, current expenditures, on average, accounted for 73.2% of the total budget.2） 
Although the remaining 30% was intended for capital expenditures, it was mainly allocated for 
durable goods, acquisition of land, and construction.  As a result, annual budgets tended to be 
unresponsive to political initiatives.
In response to these challenges, the Thaksin government pursued two important reforms.  First, 
it transformed the budget system, discussed in Part 2 of this article.  Second, it created new methods 
for budget allocation, discussed in Part 3 below.
Thai scholars have criticized the Thaksin government for a lack of fi scal discipline [Rangsan 
2005: 26], for placing public fi nances at risk3） [Weerasak 2004] and for increasing the national debt 
[Pasuk and Baker 2004: 130-131].  Pridiyathorn Devakul, Finance Minister after Thaksin’s deposal, 
blamed the former prime minister for reckless spending and huge debts in various government 
agencies [Bangkok Post, February 4, 2007].  The spending created a staggering 150 billion Baht of 
bad debt that required half of the successor government budget to clear [Bangkok Post, February 4, 
2007].  Did the Thaksin government really damage Thailand’s public fi nances?  Part 4 of this article 
will assess the effects of budget allocation on the national budget under Thaksin.
1. Origins and Scope of Thaksin Government Policies
The Thaksin government was the fi rst in Thai history to deliver on its dramatic campaign promises. 
 1） Interview with Mr. Pisit Lee-Atham, former Deputy Minister of Finance, March 11, 2008.
 2） Calculated by the author from fi gures in Thailand’s Budget in Brief for various years.
 3） Weerasak does not, however, offer any evidence of damage to public fi nances caused by the Thaksin government.
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Its platform consisted of three rural programs: an agrarian debt moratorium, a revolving fund of one 
million Baht for every village, and a 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan.  These marked refi nements of 
a National Agenda earlier proclaimed by the Thai Rak Thai Party [Pasuk and Baker 2004: 81-82].
The effective realization of these policies marked a signifi cant departure in Thai politics. 
Following the September 1992 election, for example, the leading member of a new coalition, the 
Democrat Party, failed to deliver on its promise to arrange the provincial governorship election 
because its policies differed from those of the coalition government [Rangsan 1995: 87-89].
By contrast, the Thaksin government kept its promises because of new election rules.  The 1997 
Constitution changed multiple-member constituencies to a mixture of single-member constituencies 
and a proportional representation system.  This made policies more important than candidate 
celebrity in determining electoral victory.  Thaksin was well aware of the rising signifi cance of policy. 
In establishing the Thai Rak Thai Party, he expected the party platform to become the blueprint for 
solving the nation’s problems [Walya 1999: 227].
In the 2001 general election, Thai Rak Thai was the only party to differentiate its policies from 
those of other parties.  This helped garner 11,634,495 votes—40.6% of the total—whereas the 
second place Democrat Party obtained only 7,610,789 votes, or 26.6% of the total.4）  During the 
2005 general election, the Thai Rak Thai Party continued making popular pledges, and other parties 
attempted to imitate them.  The Mahachon Party, for example, stressed advanced social welfare 
policies, and the Democrat Party promoted free education.
Pasuk and Baker argue that Thaksin worked rapidly on his election promises to court 
popularity before the Constitutional Court decided on his asset declaration case [Pasuk and Baker 
2004: 98].  The better explanation, however, is that Thaksin wanted to maintain voter support.5） 
Following a not guilty verdict from the court, Thaksin announced that he would seek a second four-
year term [Pasuk and Baker 2004: 96], this time endeavoring to win an absolute majority.  He hoped 
his party would gain 400 seats in the House of Representatives.  The target for the Northeast was set 
at 130 out of a total 138 seats [McCargo and Ukrist 2005: 85].
In the exhibition “Jak rak yar soo rak keaw,” 6） held in 2004 to highlight Thaksin’s achieve-
ments, the government outlined ninety policies [Committee editing the annual report on results of 
the implementation of fundamental state policies 2004].  As Table 1 shows, ten of these cost more 
 4） Election results as announced by the Election Commission on February 2, 2001.  For more details, see [Offi ce of the 
Election Commission of Thailand 2001].
 5） Interview with Mr. Suranand Vejjajiva, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 14, 2008.
 6） “Jak rak yar soo rak keaw,” literally means that the roots of grass become the taproots of a tree.  It suggests that 
Thaksin government policies will bring quality of life (the taproots of a tree) to the poor (the roots of grass).
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than 10,000 million Baht each.  Table 2 shows that Thaksin allocated funds for items that had never 
before appeared in the budget, at a total cost of 255,700 million Baht.
Together, Tables 1 and 2 reveal the extraordinary fi nancial demands of Thaksin’s reforms.  If we 
compare the sum of Tables 1 and 2 with the sum of the annual budget between the 2002 and 2006 
fi scal years as shown in Table 3, we see that Thaksin’s reforms came to 15.1% of the total budget.
As noted earlier, the Thai annual budget consists mainly of current expenditures, with only a 
modest portion left for capital investments, which the government allocates at its discretion.  Table 
3 shows that, between the 2002 and 2006 fi scal years, the Thaksin government’s average annual 
budget consisted of 73.44% current expenditures, 23.22% capital expenditures, and 3.34% for debt 
repayment.  At 15.1% of the total budget, in other words, Thaksin’s budgetary demands marked a 
heavy burden.
2. Budgeting System Reform under Thaksin
Since signifi cant funds were required for Thaksin’s policies, Chaturon Chaisaeng7） initiated a reform 
of the budgeting system.  Because the Bureau of the Budget had held the upper hand in allocations, 
politicians had diffi culty distributing monies to their constituencies.8）  The principle aim of reform 
 7） He was Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister from February 2001 to March 2002.  He then served in other 
Ministerial posts throughout the Thaksin administration.
 8） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
Table 1.  Budget Allocated for Thaksin Policies
Unit: Million Baht
Policies
Period of Policy 
Implementation
Amount*
 1. 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan (FY2002-FY2006) 154,468
 2. Debt Moratorium for Farmers (FY2002-FY2005) 16,335
 3. Scholarship Essay Competition and One Amphur One 
Scholarship
(FY2004-FY2006) 13,382
 4. Housing for the Poor (FY2003-FY2006) 57,866
 5. Inheritance Pension (FY2004-FY2006) 34,100
 6. Peoples’ Bank (FY2003-FY2006) 27,099
 7. Securitization (FY2004-FY2005) 81,474
 8. Small-Medium-Large Village Development Fund (FY2005-FY2006) 28,800
 9. Suvarnabhumi Airport (FY2002-FY2006) 125,000
10. Village and Urban Community Fund (FY2001-FY2006) 80,000
*Figures in this column collected by the author from various sources.
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was to enable allocation to serve the policies and strategies of the government.9）  A sub-committee10） 
chaired by Mr. Chalongpop Susangkarn drafted a budget procedure bill11） to replace Budget 
Procedure Act B.E. 2502.  Since the government’s policy statement had mentioned budgeting system 
reform,12） the cabinet had no reason in principle to obstruct the bill.
Under the new budget procedure bill, a Budget Policy Committee was to be established to deter-
mine allocations, and the Bureau of the Budget was to become the secretariat of the new committee. 
Unlike Budget Procedure Act B.E. 2502, the new budget procedure bill did not grant budgetary 
power to the Bureau of the Budget, but transferred it to the Budget Policy Committee.  Table 4 below 
 9） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
10） This sub-committee was appointed by the Committee for Budgeting System Reform, chaired by Mr. Chaturon.
11） At the time, he was president of the Thailand Development Research Institute.
12） This reference had been inserted by Mr. Chaturon.
Table 2.  Budget Allocated to New Items
Unit: Million Baht
Fiscal Year Budget Items Amount
2002 Reserve for Economic Resuscitation 58,000
2003 Expenditure for Economic and Social Restructuring 16,600
2004 Expenditure for Strengthening National Competitiveness and Sustainable 
Development
75,500
2005 - Expenditure for Strengthening National Competitiveness and Sustainable 
Development
23,400
- Expenditure for Project Implementation according to Provincial Development 
Strategies
15,000
2006 - Expenditure for Project Implementation according to Provincial Cluster and 
Provincial Development Strategies
40,000
- Expenditure for Tactic Adjustment and Accommodating Change 27,200
Source: [Bureau of the Budget 2005]
Table 3.  Composition of the Annual Budget
Unit: Million Baht
Fiscal Year Total Budget (1)
Current Expenditures (2) 
[Percentage (2): (1)]
Capital Expenditures (3)
 [Percentage (3): (1)]
Debt Repayment (4) 
[Percentage (4): (1)]
2002 1,023,000 772,605.7 [75.5] 224,725.4 [22.0] 25,668.9 [2.5]
2003 999,000 753,413.2 [75.4] 211,535  [21.1] 34,951.8 [3.5]
2004 1,028,000 772,344.4 [75.2] 221,500.2 [21.5] 34,155.4 [3.3]
2005 1,200,000 847,651.1 [70.6] 302,272.0 [25.2] 50,076.3 [4.2]
2006 1,360,000 958,477.0 [70.5] 358,335.8 [26.3] 43,187.2 [3.2]
Source: [Bureau of the Budget 2005]
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compares the budgetary power of the Director General of the Bureau of the Budget under Budget 
Procedure Act B.E. 2502 with the power of the Budget Policy Committee under the new budget 
procedure bill.
The drafting of the new budget procedure bill was completed in 2002 and approved by the 
Council of Ministers in March 2003.  The Council of State13） was charged with revising the bill 
13） It is a government agency, affiliated with the Office of the Prime Minister, in charge of legal affairs for the 
administration.
Table 4.   Power to Regulate the Budget Process: Director General of the Bureau of the Budget Compared to 
Budget Policy Committee
 1.  Authorities deciding budget 
allocation
Director General of the Bureau of 
the Budget
Budget Policy Committee
 2.  Description of powers  1.  Require government agencies 
to submit revenue and 
expenditure estimates
 1.  Prepare annual and 
supplemental budget bills
 2.  Analyze government agency 
budgets
 2.  Prioritize strategic goals for 
government agency spending
 3.  Decide budget allocations to 
government agencies under 
apportionment system
 3.  Stipulate principles and 
methods of the Public Service 
Agreement
 4.  Decide period allowed for 
government agency budgeting 
under apportionment system
 4.  Stipulate principles and 
methods for assessing 
government agency spending 
in line with Public Service 
Agreement
 5.  Stipulate budgeting system 
standards
 6.  Stipulate regulations for 
government agency spending in 
line with annual budget act
 7.  Supervise government agency 
spending in line with budget 
spending plan
 8.  Stipulate standards and prepare 
report on government agency 
spending according to Public 
Service Agreement
 9.  Stipulate standards for 
government agency annual 
reports and budget spending 
reports
10.  Appoint sub-committee 
to conduct Budget Policy 
Committee duties
11.  Conduct other budget-related 
tasks under the direction of the 
Council of Ministers
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and was approached by the Bureau of the Budget several times to make changes.  The Bureau of 
the Budget feared political interference in the budgetary process and was ultimately able to prevent 
fi nalization of the bill.14）  The Thaksin government was, consequently, unable to present the bill to 
parliament for deliberation.
The Bureau of the Budget was able to easily thwart the Thaksin government for two reasons. 
First, government leaders, who hailed from the business sector, understood problems with the 
budgetary system differently from the politicians and did not suffi ciently comprehend the principles 
of the new bill.  They did not, in other words, offer enough support for the bill to become 
law.15）  Second, as deliberations by the Council of State wore on, the Bureau of the Budget lobbied 
government leaders to abandon the bill.16）  According to Mr. Chaturon, “The cabinet approved the 
bill because the minister who took responsibility made a serious effort.  When I was reshuffl ed to a 
portfolio that did not have any responsibility for the bill, to Minister of Justice, it was forgotten.”
Although the attempt to reform the budgeting system failed, the Strategic Performance Based 
Budgeting System that was introduced in the 2002 fi scal year has been in use ever since.  Every year, 
cooperation between the National Economic and Social Development Board and the Bureau of the 
Budget determines strategies for budget allocation.  According to these strategies, every department 
must coordinate its work and projects with overseeing entities, from the department to the ministry 
to the nation.  Each proposal, therefore, includes budgets allocated to the departments.  Table 5 
below shows proposals decided for the 2003 fi scal year.
Although the prime minister took an active role in reform, some ministers did not understand 
the principles of the Strategic Performance Based Budgeting System.  Nor did departments have the 
skills needed to prepare their budgets according to strategic performance.  The old budgeting system 
14） Interview with Mr. Suranand Vejjajiva, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 14, 2008.
15） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
16） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
Table 5.  Budget Allocation for Proposals for Fiscal Year 2003
Unit: Million Baht
Proposals Allocation
1. Economic Resuscitation and Development 139,254
2. National Restructuring for Sustainable Competitiveness 56,410
3. Social Development, Poverty Resolution and Quality of Life 458,988
4. Foreign Affairs and National Security 86,959
5. National Administration 258,290
Source: [Bureau of the Budget 2005]
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did not require departments to prioritize their tasks when making budget requests.  The Strategic 
Performance Based Budgeting System, therefore, failed to meet expectations.17）
A large part of the annual budget, therefore, was prepared using methods of the old budgeting 
system.  Prescribed strategies were inserted as an extention in the annual budget later [Thaksin 2004: 
11], and they did not affect allocations.  In the 2006 fi scal year, for example, there were ten proposals 
for allocations.  The development of human resources and quality of life obtained the largest share 
of the budget: 437,772 million Baht.  As in the old budgeting system, however, allocations for these 
proposals came largely through three ministries: the Ministry of Education (199,271 million Baht), 
Ministry of Public Health (52,194 million Baht) and the National Police Offi ce (34,126 million Baht) 
[Bureau of the Budget 2005: 10-51].
In practice, the application of Strategic Performance Based Budgeting did not change allocations 
under the Thaksin administration.  The data in Table 6 below show that, except for allocations to 
the Central Fund and revolving funds, the average ministerial share of allocations under Thaksin did 
not differ signifi cantly from the previous period, especially for such smaller ministries as the Ministry 
of Commerce, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Industry.  The 
same group of ministries, moreover, ranked in the top fi ve in terms of budget priority before and 
during the Thaksin administration; this group included the Ministry of Education, Ministry of the 
Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, and the Central Fund.18）
The Thaksin government was, in other words, unable to make signifi cant changes to the 
budgeting system.  Allocations continued to be decided in the traditional fashion.  But the Bureau of 
the Budget was able to respond to the government’s demand for funds using traditional methods.  It 
successfully resisted budgeting system reform by persuading Thaksin and his key ministers that it 
would allocate suffi cient funds to implement government policies.19）
3. Budget Allocation under Thaksin
The Thaksin government was ultimately able to pursue its policies through the old budgeting system. 
Most of the proposals in Table 7 below came from the Thai Rak Thai Party platform from the 2001 
election.  Central to the platform were three rural programs: an agrarian debt moratorium, a Village 
17） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
18） The rank order within this group did differ before and during the Thaksin administration.  Before Thaksin, the 
ranking was: the Ministry of Education, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, and the 
Central Fund.  Under Thaksin, the ranking shifted to the Central Fund, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defense.
19） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
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and Urban Community Fund, and a 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan.
The agrarian debt moratorium consisted of two schemes.  First was the suspension of farmers’ 
debts—both interest and principal—for three years.  Second was debt alleviation: interest on loans 
was reduced to three percent and additional borrowing was prohibited.  The Village and Urban 
Community Fund was a sum of one million Baht distributed to villages throughout the country to 
facilitate small loans to rural residents.  Under the 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan, the Thaksin 
administration provided universal healthcare for 30 Baht per visit.  The government assumed 
responsibility for all other healthcare expenses.





Central Fund 10.3 18.9
Offi ce of the Prime Minister 0.9 1.4
Defense 12.8 7.0
Finance 12.3 11.2
Foreign Affairs 0.5 0.4





Social Development and Human Security*** — 0.4
Justice 0.4 0.6
Science 1.2 0.8
Natural Resources and Environment*** — 1.2
Education 16.2 16.2
Culture*** — 0.2
Public Health 5.9 3.9
Industry 0.5 0.3
University 3.4 1.3
Tourism and Sports*** — 0.2
Information Technology and Communication*** — 0.3
Energy*** — 0.1
Independent Public Agencies 1.2 4.7
Independent Public Bodies 0.3 0.9
State Enterprises 2.5 3.6
Revolving Funds 1.7 5.5
    * Calculated by author from fi gures in Annual Budget Acts between 1988 and 2001 fi scal years.
  ** Calculated by author from fi gures in Annual Budget Acts between 2002 and 2006 fi scal 
years.
*** These ministries were established after structural reform of the bureaucracy.  Fiscal year 
2004 was the fi rst year these ministries received funding.
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Table 7 shows that the Central Fund fi nanced three policies, the revolving fund covered one 
proposal, and state enterprises fi nanced and operated six policies.  State enterprises were a convenient 
source of funding because their investments, which could be regarded as quasi-fi scal activities, 
did not affect the budget defi cit as conventionally measured [Mackenzie and Stella 1996: 1].  The 
Thaksin government made effective use of such state enterprises as the Krung Thai Bank, the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, the Government Housing Bank, and the Government 
Savings Bank.
The Central Fund is a loophole within the budgeting system, because Article 10 of Budget 
Procedure Act B.E. 2502 allows the government to dispense monies from the Central Fund separate 
from departmental budgets.  The convenience is that, unlike with departmental budgets, the govern-
ment does not have to provide details of the Central Fund in the annual budget bill.  The prime 
minister, moreover, has full power to set the limits of the Central Fund, to which the Bureau of the 
Budget usually accedes [Kanlaya 2007: 35].
Before Thaksin, the Central Fund was used for two objectives.  First, it covered common 
expenditures for all government agencies, such as benefi ts for government offi cers.  Second, it was 
used for unexpected outlays that could not be accurately estimated in advance, such as the Contin-
gency Emergency Fund.  The composition of the Central Fund changed signifi cantly under Thaksin. 
In addition to being used regularly as mentioned, more funds were allocated from the budget to 
the Central Fund.  The Thaksin government deployed the Central Fund for two purposes: policy 
implementation and exercising more fi scal control through extraordinary budget items, as shown in 
Table 2, Part 1.
Table 7.  Budget Sources for Thaksin Policies
Sources of Budget Policies
1. Central Fund  1. Small-Medium-Large Village Development Fund
 2. Inheritance Pension
 3. Village and Urban Community Fund
2. Revolving fund  4. 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan
3. State enterprises
3.1 State enterprise incomes  5. Scholarship Essay Competition and One 
Amphur One Scholarship
3.2 Investment project  6. Suvarnabhumi Airport
3.3 Usual business  7. Peoples’ Bank
 8. Securitization
3.4 Usual business with government 
subsidies 
 9. Housing for the Poor
10. Debt Moratorium for Farmers
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In the 2002 fi scal year, the Central Fund consisted of eighteen items.  Fifteen were funded 
on a regular basis, two were used for policy implementation, and one item was reserved as an 
extraordinary budget item, intended to increase Thaksin’s power over allocations.  Table 8 shows the 
composition of the Central Fund under the Thaksin administration.  The magnitude of the Central 
Fund increased signifi cantly under Thaksin.  Its share of the total budget rose from 9.6% in the 2001 
fi scal year to 18.8% in 2006, and it reached its peak in 2004 of 22.9% of the total budget.20）
The Central Fund was used to fi nance three policies: the Small-Medium-Large Village 
Development Fund, the Inheritance Pension for Living, and the Village and Urban Community Fund. 
Extraordinary budget items were reserved as a lump-sum for the Thaksin government to spend at 
its discretion.  These items were called “Ngob Phee,” or “budget of the ghost,” because they were 
unidentifi able, and they varied from year to year.
The Thaksin cabinet decided on details of the extraordinary budget after parliamentary 
approval of the annual budget bill.  Interestingly, many projects that received funds from depart-
ments through the regular budget process also obtained support from the extraordinary budget. 
For instance, in the 2002 fi scal year, a “Reserve for Economic Resuscitation” fund was allocated 
to projects covered by regular departments, e.g., local roads construction (Department of Public 
Works), road maintenance (Department of Highways), and police housing construction (National 
Police Offi ce) [Chitlada n.d.: 12-16].
The Thaksin government deployed the revolving fund in similar ways as the Central Fund. 
20） Calculated by the author from fi gures in the Annual Budget Acts and the Additional Budget Acts.  For the 2004 
fi scal year, the mid-year additional budget was included in the calculation.










1997 86,689 (100) — — 86,689 (100)
1998 76,590 (100) — — 76,590 (100)
1999 76,911 (100) — — 76,911 (100)
2000 76,936 (100) — — 76,936 (100)
2001 86,912 (100) — — 86,912 (100)
2002 112,291 (61.0) 13,650 (7.4) 58,000 (31.6) 183,941 (100)
2003 118,234 (80.1) 12,800 (8.7) 16,600 (11.2) 147,634 (100)
2004 178,801 (67.3) 11,525 (4.3) 75,500 (28.4) 265,826 (100)
2005 191,148 (76.4) 20,642 (8.3) 38,400 (15.3) 250,190 (100)
2006 156,885 (61.2) 32,135 (12.5) 67,200 (26.3) 256,220 (100)
Source: [Bureau of the Budget 2005]
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With full power to determine allocations in a revolving fund, Thaksin established a new one, the 
National Health Security Fund, to implement the 30 Baht-per-Visit Healthcare Plan.  Consequently, 
monies allocated to the revolving fund under Thaksin increased from 3.9% of the total in the 2001 
fi scal year to 5.7% in 2006.21）
It can be argued that budget allocation under Thaksin was based on a compromise between 
the Bureau of the Budget and government leaders.  Although the Bureau of the Budget had lobbied 
to keep the budgeting system unchanged, it also supported Thaksin policies by allowing funding 
through the Central Fund and revolving fund.  Thaksin relied heavily on these funds as the principal 
means around the traditional practice of distributing monies through departments, in which the 
Bureau of the Budget retained the upper hand.
The Central Fund was also critical to the Thaksin government for its convenience.  Thaksin 
explained that “under the infl exible budgeting system, the government reserved a small amount of 
money—one or two percent of the total budget—to cope with some diffi culties” [Thaksin 2004: 12]. 
The idea was based on a business management concept, because “there are no organizations in the 
world that do not reserve cash for special projects that they want to undertake or for emergencies.” 22） 
In other words, an important part of governance is handling urgent ad hoc tasks.  The old budgeting 
system, however, could not muster the fi nancial resources required in an emergency.  The Thaksin 
government needed the Central Fund in part to solve urgent problems.23）
4. Effects of Budget Allocation on Public Finances under Thaksin
The varied means of allocation used by the Thaksin government give the appearance of reckless 
spending.  The empirical data indicate, however, that Thailand’s macro economy was not at risk 
under Thaksin.  The data in Table 9 below reveal that total government debt did not increase 
signifi cantly.  Government debt in the last year of the Thaksin administration differed little from 
either the fi rst year or last year of the previous government.  It stood at 25% of GDP in 2006 com-
pared to 24.8 and 23.5% in 2001 and 2000, respectively.  The Thaksin government was, moreover, 
able to transform a defi cit into a balanced budget in the 2005 fi scal year, as shown in Table 10.
There are three important fi scal rules in Thailand, which are determined primarily by the 
Constitution, Treasury Reserve Act B.E. 2491, and Budget Procedure Act B.E. 2502.  The fi rst rule 
requires legislative approval for spending.  The second regulates national revenues and expenditures: 
21） Calculated by the author from fi gures in the Annual Budget Acts.
22） Interview with Mr. Suranand Vejjajiva, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 14, 2008.
23） Interview with Mr. Chaturon Chaisaeng, former Minister of the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, November 20, 2008.
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all transactions must be conducted through the Treasury Reserve Account.  The third and most 
important rule states that the annual budget defi cit cannot exceed 20% of the total plus 80% of 
expenditures for debt repayment.  The Thaksin government did not violate any of these rules.
Steady increases in the annual budget under Thaksin were in keeping with continued economic 
growth.24）  Actual government revenues, moreover, exceeded estimates in most fi scal years.  Of the 
24） Between 2002 and 2006, the average growth rate of the annual budget was 7.7%, whereas the average GDP growth 
rate was 5.7%.  The growth rate of the annual budget is calculated from fi gures in the Annual Budget Acts.  The 
GDP growth rate comes from the Bank of Thailand.  For more details, see [Bank of Thailand 2008].
Table 9.  Internal and External Government Debt
Unit: Million Baht
Year Government Debt GDP at current prices Government Debt Share of GDP* (%)
1997 325,537 4,732,600  6.9
1998** 694,206 4,626,400 15.0
1999 991,104 4,637,000 21.4
2000 1,156,584 4,922,700 23.5
2001 1,272,856 5,133,500 24.8
2002 1,691,158 5,450,600 31.0
2003 1,631,124 5,917,300 27.6
2004 1,810,439 6,489,400 27.9
2005 1,857,247 7,095,600 26.2
2006 1,954,038 7,830,300 25.0
  * Calculated by author.
** In 1998 government debt rose sharply following the 1997 economic crisis.
Source: [Bank of Thailand 2008]
Table 10.  Budget Defi cits
Unit: Million Baht
Fiscal Year Total Budget Estimated Revenues Budget Defi cit
1997 984,000 984,000 —
1998* 982,000 982,000 —
1999 825,000 800,000 25,000
2000 860,000 750,000 110,000
2001 910,000 805,000 105,000
2002 1,023000 823,000 200,000
2003 999,000 805,000 194,000
2004 1,028,000 928,100 99,900
2005 1,200,000 1,200,000 —
2006 1,360,000 1,360,000 —
* As a result of the economic crisis, the total budget for the 1998 fi scal year was reduced to 800,000 million 
Baht, and estimated revenues were reduced to 782,020 million Baht.  The budget that year ultimately 
showed a defi cit of 17,980 million Baht.
Source: [Bureau of the Budget 2005]
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three revenue-collecting departments—the Revenue Department, the Excise Department, and the 
Customs Department—the Revenue Department was most important for increasing tax income.
If the increase in tax income followed economic growth, it also confi rmed Revenue Depart-
ment projections.  The Revenue Department underwent two important changes with Thaksin: 
restructuring, and a new method of tax collection.  Before restructuring, tax collection within the 
Revenue Department was divided between the central administration and the provinces.  The central 
administration was charged with tax collection in Bangkok, where many area offi ces were located. 
Provincial Revenue Offi ces in each province took responsibility for local revenues.  The Heads of 
these offi ces answered to provincial governors.  Following restructuring, the Revenue Department 
was centralized and Provincial Revenue Offi ces abolished.  Tax collection was consolidated into one 
unit under the central administration [Revenue Department 2003: 38].  Provincial offi ces became 
area offi ces reporting directly, like area offi ces in Bangkok, to the Director General of the Revenue 
Department.
The most important cause of increased tax revenues was a change in the method of tax collec-
tion.  In the past, punishment through auditing of prior payments was the preferred weapon against 
tax evasion.  The Thaksin administration, however, introduced moral suasion.  The Revenue Depart-
ment closely monitored taxpayers, especially businesses, and persuaded them to make accurate 
payments.  Meanwhile, audits were reduced [Revenue Department 2003: 48, 2004: 50].  Taxpayers 
responded well to this change, and tax revenue increased.
The new system saw offi cers from the Revenue Department dispatched to business fi rms to 
check the accuracy of payments.  The offi cers used data from other sources, e.g., electricity and 
water usage and number of employees registered with the Social Security Offi ce, to assess the actual 
incomes of the fi rms [Prachachartturakit, May 13, 2005].  The Revenue Department established the 
Bureau of Large Business Tax Administration to supervise large taxpayers.  This Bureau provided 
legal services and individual consultation for each fi rm [Revenue Department 2004: 33].
The Revenue Department also succeeded in increasing the number of taxpayers.  In 2004, it 
persuaded 201,329 new taxpayers [Ministry of Finance 2004: 2] to register in its database of seven 
million taxpayers.  As a result of more effi cient collection, tax revenues increased continually under 
Thaksin.  Table 11 shows that all major forms of tax revenue—personal income tax, corporate tax, 
and value added tax—increased every fi scal year.
Conclusion
Popular policies and dramatic reforms made Thaksin seem a strong executive.  The government was 
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not, however, able to establish full control over the budget.  Thaksin failed to create a Budget Policy 
Committee, which would have transferred the power of allocation from the Bureau of the Budget to 
Thailand’s politicians.
Thaksin did, however, take advantage of a loophole in the old budgeting system to fi nance its 
policies.  Rather than work exclusively through the departments as usual, the government made good 
use of the Central Fund and revolving fund, over which it had full power.  It also looked to state 
enterprises.  Extraordinary budget items added to the Central Fund marked the fi nal powerful tool in 
the government’s effort to fi nance its policies.
Thaksin’s methods for budget allocation were not, however, institutionalized.  Following the 
collapse of his government, some of these methods were abandoned.  The share of the total budget 
allocated to the Central Fund decreased from 18.8% in the 2006 fi scal year, the last annual budget 
prepared by Thaksin, to 12.6, 14.6, and 13.6% in 2007, 2008, and 2009,25） respectively.26）  Extraor-
dinary budget items, or Ngob Phee, which had nicely served Thailand’s politicians, were removed 
from the budget in the 2007 fi scal year.  By contrast, funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense, 
which served the demands of the bureaucracy, increased.  Although the growing share of defense 
monies does not seem permanent, it rose from 6.3% of the total budget in the 2006 fi scal year to 7.3 
and 8.6% in 2007 and 2008, respectively.27）
25） Even though the annual budget for the 2009 fi scal year was prepared by the Samak government led by the Palang 
Prachachon Party, most ministers came from the Thai Rak Thai Party.  The Central Fund is much less signifi cant 
now than in the 2006 fi scal year.
26） Calculated by the author from fi gures in the Annual Budget Acts.
27） Calculated by the author from fi gures in the Annual Budget Acts.













Personal Income Tax 108,371 117,309 135,220 147,395 170,087
Corporate Tax 170,415 208,859 261,925 329,558 374,818
Value Added Tax 228,196 261,306 316,103 385,718 417,770
Specifi c Business Tax 13,715 12,757 20,033 26,307 30,625
Petroleum Tax 19,128 21,773 31,935 41,178 56,524
Stamp Duty 4,122 5,348 6,821 6,821 7,260
Other Income 334 331 279 266 243
Total 544,281 627,682 772,316 937,243 1,057,327
Source: [Revenue Department]
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